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Abstract
There is an ongoing controversy in ®nancial economics regarding the role of time horizon in portfolio selection.
This problem is relevant in a broader context, wherever consumers or managers make decisions that involve both
time and risk. The purpose of this paper is to review recent ®ndings from the decision making literature so as to
shed new light on how the short run vs. long run contingency may determine risk taking and perception.
Key words: decision making under risk and uncertainty, time horizon, risk perception, temporal diversi®cation
Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that investors with a long time horizon should invest more
heavily in risky assets, namely stocks, than investors with a short time horizon. Actuaries
have even devised a rule of thumb for computing the percentage of bonds versus stocks
one should hold as a function of one's age. This rule is surprisingly simple: this percentage
is said to be equal to one's age. In other words when one turns eighty, one should holdeighty percent bonds and twenty percent equity! The reverse holds true for a twenty-year
old.
This notion that risk taking should depend on time horizon does not solely pertain to the
®nancial domain. In marketing, as brand-management systems have emphasized short-
term sales response, there has been a drift from advertising towards price promotions,
which are known to be the low risk alternative in terms of their ability to boost demand in
the short run (Blattberg and Neslin, 1989).
Yet, theoretical research in ®nance, under standard assumptions about utility functions,
has rejected the intuitive notion that the optimal risky asset proportion should depend on
the decision maker's time horizon (Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969). This paper reviews a
set of recent conceptual innovations in the literature on decision making under risk and
over time in order to facilitate a re-examination of the issue of risk perception in the short
run and in the long run.
In the next section, we review a set of developments around the notion of risk attitude
and its re-conceptualization under two circumstances that relate to the short run versus
long run contingency: when there is uncertainty about probabilities and when there is
background risk. Then we examine how a better understanding of time preferences and
other dynamic in¯uences on preferences may enrich the realistic study of risk perception in
the short run and in the long run. In the concluding section, we highlight three research
themes (risk management in consumer choice, risk management in new product develop-
ment, and managerial decision making under ambiguity) which are seen as promising
areas for further applied research.
1. Risk and Risk Perception
In real-world decision-making contexts, uncertainty comes from the human inability to
access and assess all decision-relevant information in its complexity and relatedness. That
incapacity causes decision-makers to adopt a simpli®ed view of their environment, where
risk and uncertainty remain as an integral and exogenous component.
Since Markowitz (1952), there has been extensive research on how decision-makers
should choose among composite alternatives that combine stochastic outcomes. The basis
for Markowitz' ideas was that ``a portfolio of securities is entirely different from holdings
considered individually'' (Bernstein, 1996). Indeed, the riskiness of a composite portfolio
depends on how the various forms of uncertainty combine, potentially interact with each
other to either cancel out or multiply each other's in¯uence.
However, whereas such traditional theories specify how people should make decisions
in the face of uncertainty and what the world would look like if people did in fact behave
as speci®ed, several of their underlying assumptions and implications are being system-
atically violated.
First, consider the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). Subjects are ®rst requested to express
their preferences between two prospects. The ®rst, called A, guarantees winning $3,000
with probability 1, while the second, called B, is a lottery that yields $4,000 with
probability 0.8. Next, subjects also choose between lottery C of winning $3,000 with
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preferences are AB and DC. Since C0.25 A  0.75 d0 and D0.25 B  0.75
d0 (where d0 is the ``null-prospect'' of winning 0 with probability 1), such preferences
violate the independence axiom, the key axiom of expected utility theory. Recent advances
in decision making under risk relate this type of violation to a ``probability weighting
function'' that offers an effective formal equivalent to the concept of ``risk perception.''
Second, decision-makers appear to be not only sensitive to risk about outcomes but also to
(second-order) uncertainty or ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961). Ellsberg points out that most
people prefer a lottery with known probabilities than a subjectively equivalent lottery with
unknown probabilities. Third, most theoretical developments examine a decision-maker
whose initial situation is riskless. In reality, there is generally some undiversi®able
``background risk'' that needs to be accounted for in a correct analysis.
This section reviews signi®cant advances regarding these three components: probability-
weighting functions, ambiguity, and background risk. Even though it remains to be
actively documented, it is likely that these three components are affected by decision
horizon in a way that ultimately affects risk taking.
1.1. The Probability Weighting Function
The probability weighting function provides decision theorists with a formal tool to
represent an individual's risk perception, distinct from the concept of risk aversion. We can
trace the origins of this tool to the debates surrounding the type of risk aversion allowed by
the traditional model of expected utility.
The most natural way to de®ne risk aversion is as a tendency to choose, when possible,
to avoid risk. More precisely, weak risk aversion characterizes a decision-maker who
always prefers to any random variable X the certainty of its expected value E(X). Another
way to de®ne risk aversion is to de®ne it as a dislike of some type of (mean preserving)
increasing risk. For example, strong risk aversion refers to an aversion towards mean-
preserving spreads (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). Cohen (1995) gives a more elaborate
overview of the different concepts of risk aversion. Remarkably, a notion as simple as
aversion to increasing variance (well-known by ®nance practitioners) is not always
compatible with the de®nition of weak risk aversion. This is particularly apparent in the
expected utility model of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). In this classical model,
aversion to increasing variance is compatible with weak risk aversion only under very
restricted circumstances (e.g., when the utility function is quadratic, or when the
encountered random variables are normal or uniform, see Ingersoll, 1987). The expected
utility model has also been questioned for its descriptive validity (e.g., in the Allais
paradox) and for the dif®culty to interpret von Neumann's utility function, which is not
merely an index of wealth satisfaction.
The probability weighting function is embedded in the rank-dependent expected utility
model
1 (RDEU), a recent model of decision under risk that proves to be compatible with
observed behavior such as the Allais paradox. A decision-maker behaves in accordance
with the RDEU model when his=her preferences can be characterized by two functions u
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on certain outcomes, and an increasing function f from [0,1] to [0,1] with f(0)0 and
f(1)1 that we call the probability-weighting function. For a discrete random variable X
denoted by (x1, p1;...xk, pk;...;xn, pn) with ranked outcomes x1 <x2 < <xn, and
probabilities pi 0 (such that Si pi 1), we can de®ne qi  pi1 pn, and write the
RDEU associated with X as
ux1f q1 ux2ÿux1  f q2
ux3ÿux2f qnÿ1uxnÿuxnÿ1: 1
A ``RDEU decision maker'' takes the utility of the worst outcome u(x1) and weighs the
additional possible increases of utility u(xi)7u(xiÿ1) by his personal perception f(qi) of the
probability qi of having at least xi. According to this interpretation, if the decision maker
behaves in such a way that p f(p), it means that (s)he underestimates all the additional
utilities of gains (consistent with the Allais paradox). In this sense, (s)he can be called
pessimistic under risk.
Avery simple example can be used to show the role of a probability weighting function:
let X be an asset that yields x with probability p and y with probability 17p. The valuation
of this asset in a RDEU model is V(X )[17f(17p)]  u(x)  f (17p)  u(y)i fx<y and
V(X)f (p)  u(x)  [17f(p)]  u(y)i fy<x. It has been shown (see, e.g., Chateauneuf,
Cohen, Meilijson, 1997) that any type of risk aversion in RDEU implies
f(p)  f(17p)<1 and the decision-maker always underestimates the probability of the
best outcome and overweighs the probability of the worse outcome. The different concepts
of risk aversion, while all equivalent in EU theory, have different characterizations for u
and f in RDEU model, (Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson, 1997; Chew, Karni, and Safra,
1987).
From an empirical point of view, the probability weighting function f has been assessed
by, among others, Abdellaoui (1998), Tversky and Wakker (1995), Wu and Gonzalez
(1996), and axiomatically justi®ed by Prelec (1997).
We don't know of any ®ndings regarding the impact of time horizon (e.g., remoteness in
time of a lottery) on the shape of the probability weighting function. Are people more or
less pessimistic regarding risks that occur in the long run? A rigorous study of this
relationship would be a sensible start for a re-examination of risk perception in the short
run and in the long run.
1.2. Uncertainty about probabilities
So far, we have assumed that probability distributions are given. In the context of expected
utility theory, probabilities are exogenous, i.e., they are not part of the beliefs of the
decision maker. In the case of subjective expected utility, decision makers use their own
subjective probability distributions. When such is the case, one would think that there are
some decision situations where decision makers feel certain about subjective probabilities
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is no room for uncertainty about probabilities. For a simple lottery, which pays 100 if an
event occurs and nothing if the event A does not occur, the subjective expected utility of
the lottery is always Pr(A)u(100)  [17Pr(A)]  u(O), regardless of how sure the decision
makers feel about the probability of the event. But imagine that you have to assess the
stock price distribution of a well-known stock versus the distribution of a rather unknown
stock. You might feel more certain (or competent) in judging the well-known stock versus
the unknown stock. On average, people are averse to the ambiguity of betting on an
unknown event. Following this idea you prefer to bet on the well-known stock versus
betting on the unknown stock.
The effect of ambiguity on decision making under uncertainty was most clearly
demonstrated by the famous Ellsberg paradox. Ellsberg (1961) posed a two-color problem
(and a more elaborate three-color problem) using two urns, Urn I containing 50 red and 50
black balls and Urn II containing 100 balls in an unknown combination of red and black.
Many people prefer to bet on red from Urn I (rather than betting on red from Urn II) and
prefer to bet on black from Urn I rather than betting on black from Urn II. In addition, they
are indifferent between the two colors when betting on only one of the two urns. Since
Ellsberg, there have been numerous demonstrations that attitudes towards ambiguity
impacts decision-making under uncertainty (see Camerer and Weber, 1992 for an over-
view).
There are numerous competing theories to model ambiguity effects and numerous
studies to demonstrate the effect. Luce (1991), Luce and Fishburn (1991), Schmeidler
(1989), Sarin and Wakker (1992), Starmer and Sudgen (1989), Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), Tversky and Wakker (1995) and Wakker and Tversky (1993) have developed
Choquet expected utility theory (as well as ``cumulative prospect theory'') to allow for
nonneutral attitudes towards ambiguity. First, rank the states si from 1 to n based on their
utilities m(f(si)). Then, Choquet expected utility is de®ned as
u f s1  ps1
P n
i2











The rank-dependent extension of prospect theory (called cumulative prospect theory)
uses Choquet integrals to compute decision weights. The twist is that Choquet weighting
re¯ects around the origin.
In our thinking, ambiguity effects can best be understood by the fact that a decision
maker prefers to bet on some sources of uncertainty over some other sources of
uncertainty, i.e., preferences are source-dependent. If you have German students bet on
German stocks, they will most likely prefer this bet to a bet on Japanese stocks (everything
else being equal), see Kilka and Weber (1998) for this speci®c example. Japanese students,
in contrast, might prefer to bet on their home stocks, i.e., the ambiguity effect might well
depend on the knowledge or competence a decision maker has in evaluating an event, see
Heath and Tversky (1991), Tversky and Fox (1995), Keppe and Weber (1995), Fox,
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this topic.
Now, what does this imply for risk perception in the long run and in the short run? To
the best of our knowledge, it has not been investigated how ambiguity effects relate to risk
perception. Intuitively, one would say that lotteries where subjects show strong ambiguity
aversion would also be judged to be more riskyÐbut we don't know. There is also very
little known about ambiguity effects over time. Thus there is room for research on how
ambiguity affects short term vs. long term risks. Discussing ambiguity in the light of
uncertainty over preferences or even second order probabilities, one might hypothesize
that ambiguity diminishes or reduces over time as the decision maker learns more about
the probability of the event (or (s)he feels more competent in judging the event).
1.3. Background risk
Standard textbooks deal with risk aversion in the following context: either a decision
maker has a certain wealth and is faced with a choice that makes his wealth become risky
(investment problems), or the initial wealth is risky and the decision maker considers
possibilities to hedge, insure, or get partially rid of the risky part of his=her wealth. In both
cases, the comparison is between a risky situation and a riskless one.
In contrast, the recent literature on background risk addresses the issue of how to deal
with situations where some risks remain out of reach for the decision maker. Such
situations are relevant to a number of real life (and even economic) problems, for instance
an increase or a deterioration in risk perception, a non-insurable risk (wages, for instance),
or a risky investment which cannot be hedged by ®nancial instruments (incomplete
markets).
A number of puzzling results appeared in the literature, which questioned the validity of
the traditional approach when background risk prevails. For instance, Kihlstrom, Romer
and Williams, (1981) showed that an increase in risk aversion (measured by Arrow-Pratt's
index, in the context of expected utility theory) does not imply a decrease in risky
investment, in the presence of background risk. Similar results can be found in the
insurance literature (e.g., Doherty and Schlesinger, 1983).
The main dif®culty with background risk is that a riskless benchmark is not available
anymore to compare situations. As a consequence the literature has dwelled on relevant
re®nements of the notion of risk aversion. Main contributions are: Pratt and Zeckhauser's
(1987) ``Proper risk aversion'' (risk aversion is proper if adding an undesirable risk to
wealth has a negative impact on the attitude towards other risks), Kimball's (1993)
``Standard risk aversion'' (any risk that makes a small reduction in wealth more painful,
also makes any statistically independent undesirable risk more painful), Gollier and Pratt's
(1996) ``Risk vulnerability'' (an undesirable background risk increases aversion to other
independent risks). Yet another approach is to focus on relevant notions of ``risk increase''
(see Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 1997 for a survey).
With tools and results which have been developed only so recently, the literature on time
horizon effects in the presence of background risk cannot be expected to be very broad.
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the ones proposed by Samuelson (1963, 1989) and by Merton (1969). For instance, an
empirical paper from Guiso, Japeeli and Terlizee (1996) on the relation between age and
risk taking in a cross-section of Italian household shows that young people (facing higher
income risk) hold smaller proportion of risky assets in their portfolios. Yet, Bodie, Merton
and Samuelson (1992) showed that young people with constant relative risk aversion
should take greater investment risks than older ones. In a recent paper, Gollier and
Zeckhauser (1997) concentrate on the following question: under what conditions on the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function would longer time horizon increase risk
aversion? Such characterizations are highly technical (fourth derivative) and do not shed
much light on individual behavior in front of time horizon and the resolution of
uncertainty. However they yield interesting nonintuitive results which show that one
needs to be careful with problems of risk perception in the long run when background risk
prevails.
2. Dynamics of Risk and Risk Perception
2.1. Time diversi®cation
Over the last three decades much research has been devoted to the study of the notions of
risk and diversi®cation. More speci®cally, it has been shown in a one-period context that
investors can achieve so-called mean-variance ef®cient equity portfolios by diversifying
across a number of stocks. This result is reminiscent of the old saying that one should not
put all one's eggs into the same basket. The next step has been to consider a multi-period
framework including not only stocks but also bonds. Indeed, conventional wisdom holds
that investors with a long time horizon should invest more heavily in risky assets, namely
stocks, than investors with a short time horizon. This time horizon effect is usually
interpreted from the point of view that in the long run stocks out perform bonds and that
younger investors have more time to recoup in case things turn sour in the equity market.
This is the so-called time-diversi®cation effect.
Although this effect seems at ®rst intuitive, several classical theories in ®nance do not
support it. Indeed, this conventional wisdom is usually attributed to a fallacy (Samuelson,
1963, Merton and Samuelson, 1974). Both Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) show
that the optimal risky asset proportion is independent of the investor's age. All else equal,
the young manager and the old widow should both invest the same percentage of their
wealth in equity. This result is obtained in an intertemporal context with a stationary
distribution of returns and under a speci®c set of utility functions.
2
This debate has been recently renewed by Bodie (1995). Bodie took an alternative
stance by relying upon an option-theoretic framework instead of using an expected utility
framework. Taking as a measure of the riskiness of an investment the cost of insuring it
against earning less than the risk-free rate over the investor's time horizon, Bodie showed
that the riskiness of stocks increases rather than decreases with the length of the time-
horizon. In other words, by de®ning riskiness in a shortfall insurance context, Bodie was
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that, indeed, the price of an insurance contract against the risk of a shortfall should increase
with its maturity. A twenty-year insurance policy should be more expensive than a one-
year insurance policy.
The time-diversi®cation debate is far from being settled. The surprising feature though
in Bodie's contribution is that his result is derived in a preference-free framework.
2.2 Special issues with dynamic risks
Growth, feedback and externalities are an inalienable part of economic and marketing
decision-environments (see, e.g., Arthur, 1994). Therefore, the perception of long-run risk
will likely depend in part on the dynamics in the market place caused by these phenomena.
In contrast, perception of short-run risks can be relatively immune to the in¯uence of
longer-run dynamics of markets.
Feedback. For the long run, the relevant question with respect to the time dependence of
risks is: does uncertainty have a tendency to cancel itself out over time? Or do the forces
that create decision risk accumulate or even multiply the variability of the decision
outcomes over time? For example, if the occurrence of a success (in a general sense) is
positively in¯uenced by a past failure and vice versa then we may speak of negative
feedback among outcomes. If on the other hand, successes depend positively on previous
successes (and the same for failures) then positive feedback among outcomes exists. With
such feedback, uncertainties in winning or losing tend to cancel out in the ®rst case but
accumulate in the latter.
Samuelson (1991) posits a ``rebound'' model of long-term market behavior in which
returns on risky stocks are negatively correlated through time and a ``momentum'' model
of long-term market behavior in which returns are positively correlated through time. The
question is how this contingency might impact risk-taking by investors. Samuelson ®nds,
under some conditions, that investors allocate a larger portion of their wealth to risky
stocks when they ®nd themselves investing in rebound markets than when market behavior
is consistent with the momentum model. Central to the issue of time-dependence of risk
perception, he hypothesizes that the difference in risk taking across rebound- and
momentum-markets increases with the length of the planning horizon.
Behavioral economists con®rm that feedback effects may exist. De Bondt and Thaler
(1985) ®nd that equity markets over-react, i.e., that equity markets seem to behave
consistent with rebound markets. Also, the gambler's fallacy (a gambler's tendency to
avoid betting on recent winners and to favor outcomes which have not come up for a while,
Clotfelter and Cook, 1993) and recency biases (Rabin, 1998) may contribute in the same
way to time-dependence of risk attitude and perception.
Dynamic risks caused by feedback are also examined in the literature on positive
network externalities. Arthur (1994) uses the Po Âlya urn scheme (Po Âlya, 1931), as a model
for the dynamic process with which market shares of two competing new technologies
evolve. A Po Âlya urn scheme is a process where repeated draws from two types of balls (the
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type. Such a process displays positive feedback. The standard Po Âlya urn scheme starts with
one ball of each type, say a red ball and a black ball. Subsequently a draw of any type
results in replacement of two balls of the same type. For example, after the ®rst draw there
may be either two red balls and one black ball or one red ball and two black balls. Because
of the feedback, the next draw is more likely of the color with the highest share (enforcing
the dominance subsequently). After many draws, the share of red balls in the urn
converges to a ®xed value on [0,1]. The limiting distribution of this limiting share turns
out to be a uniform distribution (Johnson and Kotz, 1977).
The above case, short-term uncertainty is low (two possible payoffs with known
probabilities) whereas a-priori uncertainty about the long term market share is high
(long-term shares are uniformly distributed, i.e. literally anything may happen). Indeed, the
variance in outcomes is less after one round of the process that the up-front variance in the
long-term outcomes.
Therefore, managers facing similar positive feedback will likely perceive the evolution
of market shares as a long-term risk although this evolution is most sensitive to current
events. The stylized example above also offers an interpretation for why ®rms develop a
portfolio of products. If uncertainty accumulates through time, it seems prudent to allocate
resources to multiple independent new products, rather than putting all resources of a ®rm
behind a single project at a time.
Payoff externalities. When looking at intertemporal choices, another question must be
raised: can the perception of long-run risk be affected by the organizational environment of
the decision maker?
Research in ®nance does support this view. For instance, it has been noted that both
corporations and institutional investors appear to be concerned by the timing of returns and
to exhibit a preference for the short run. One argument usually given is that they bear more
risk in the long run (see also the preceding discussion). However, theoretical work suggests
that their intertemporal choices are more likely to be in¯uenced by the existence of payoff
externalities resulting from various market imperfections. Indeed, this may explain that
opting for the short-run could be viewed as a way to `play safe', regardless of the inherent
level of risk.
The literature emphasizes that information problems or incentive issues could drive a
preference for the short-run. One can take as an example the work on corporate myopia,
which attempts to rationalize that industrial ®rms display a bias toward short-term
investment. Some models highlight that reputation concerns can cause a preference for
the early resolution of uncertainty. They typically show that a manager may need to
produce early returns in order to convey private information (Holmstrom, 1982; Webb,
1993). For example, in Holmstrom (1982), the manager is concerned by his labor market
value. Thus, s=he chooses an investment project that delivers the cash ¯ows rapidly in
order to quickly resolve the market uncertainty regarding his=her ability. In Webb (1993)
and Thakor (1993), the short-term investment bias results from the manager's effort to
mitigate an adverse selection problem in ®nancial markets. Webb looks at corporations that
must obtain credit from banks in a world of asymmetric information about the quality of
RISK PERCEPTION IN THE SHORT RUN AND IN THE LONG RUN 275earning streams. Since lenders cannot discriminate between ®rms on an ex ante basis,
managers of `good' ®rms invest in projects that yield early returns in order to prove quality.
Hence, they can subsequently try to renegotiate loan contingencies or proceed to additional
borrowings at `fair' ®nancial terms.
The literature on corporate myopia shows also that the preference for the short run may
be driven by principal-agent concerns. For example, Noe and Rebello (1997) demonstrate
that, in order to minimise cash ¯ows expropriation, shareholders may have to devise
compensation schemes tied to the short-term performance. Thus, managers tend to
concentrate on short-term returns and to forgo long-term investment projects.
What conclusion can we draw from these examples? Perhaps that the perception of long-
run risk can be hard to isolate from the decision-maker's concern for the early (or late)
resolution of uncertainty when externalities prevails.
2.3. Preference dynamics
Individual time preferences are usually captured by the rate at which consumers discount
future outcomes, or by the rate of intertemporal substitution, at which consumers trade off
present and future outcomes. In the standard expected utility framework, the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is the inverse of the coef®cient of relative risk aversion (see, e.g.,
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Yet recent empirical research has not only suggested that the
two are independent (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro, 1997) but also that uncertainty
about future outcomes may affect how outcomes are discounted (Ahlbrecht and Weber,
1997; Stevenson, 1992). Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) con®rmed the ®nding by Stevenson
(1992) that risky outcomes are less discounted than certain outcomes, perhaps due to a
cognitive dif®culty to account simultaneously for both risk and time concerns. Below, we
suggest that several non-normative features of time preference may affect intertemporal
choice under uncertainty in several ways.
Short-term risk seeking and dynamic inconsistency. First, some dynamic preference
inconsistencies may appear as short-term risk seeking. Strotz (1956) showed that
consistent utility maximizing consumers discount future outcomes at a constant rate
[e.g., nt(x)n0(x)=(1  r)
t, or exponential discounting, where n is the value of an outcome
x, obtained immediately at time t0 or later at t>0, and r is the discount rate]. Yet actual
preferences are often characterized by non-constant discounting [e.g., nt(x)n0(x)=(1  t),
or hyperbolic discounting, where the discount rate increases with the number of periods;
see Ainslie, 1975; Kirby, 1997; Laibson, 1996; Strotz, 1956]. Impulsive behaviors such as
smoking that have uncertain, delayed, negative consequences may be viewed as risk
seeking in the long run, although they often correspond to dynamically inconsistent
preferences. This perspective suggests that future research should examine if long-term
risk seeking may be modeled as impulsive behavior via non-constant discounting or,
conversely, whether certain types of impulsive behavior can be represented without
resorting to non-constant discounting (as in Wathieu, 1997b). Self-control via precommit-
ment could indeed be seen as an attempt to forestall future risk seeking choices at a time
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Wertenbroch, 1998; Wertenbroch and Carmon, 1997 for implications of self-control in
marketing).
Short-term risk aversion and myopic loss aversion. Work by Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
suggests that what looks like short-term risk aversion in repeated choices may result from
loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Speci®cally, decision makers with loss
averse utility functions who evaluate each choice in a series of risky individual decisions
(i.e., myopically) prefer not to make choices that may lead to losses, even when the
expected value of these choices is positive (Lopes, 1981; Samuelson, 1963). However,
evaluating a series of such gambles jointly may yield positive expected utility even under
loss aversion. Thus, what Benartzi and Thaler (1995) term myopic loss aversion ampli®es
risk aversion in standard utility models and leads to inconsistent preferences depending on
whether decision makers take a short-run or long-run perspective. The effect of myopic
loss aversion can be attenuated by precommitment (Strotz, 1956), speci®cally to an
aggregate evaluation mode. For example, considering that long-term stock returns have
historically been highly positive (but see Jorion and Goetzmann, 1999), long-term
investors may maximize returns by preventing themselves from re-evaluating their
portfolios on a regular basis (Redelmeier and Tversky, 1992; Kahneman and Lovallo,
1993; Wathieu, 1997b). Note, however, that consumers may be unable to anticipate
preference inconsistencies due to myopic loss aversion (see Loewenstein and Adler, 1995).
Nevertheless, frequent outcome feedback may create self-control problems as it can shift
one's reference point and induce myopic loss aversion, leading to choices that one may
prefer not to make from a long-term perspective.
Experiential learning. Recent work by March (1996) suggests that risk taking behavior is
learned by decision-makers and is not an exogenous trait of humans or utility functions.
March uses experiential learning to explain why decision-makers are risk-seeking in losses
and risk-averse in gains. According to the theory of experiential learning, humans from
preferences based on past choices, i.e., they reinforce preference for options with past
positive rewards and they discount preferences for options with past negative rewards.
March reviewed the consequences of various such positive or negative reinforcement
mechanisms for choices between a certain prospect X and a risky prospect that yields 0
with probability p and X=(17p) with probability (17p). His studies with simulated
subjects suggests that various experimential learning rules induced longterm preferences
for the certain prospect when X is positive and induced long-term preferences for the risky
prospect when X is negative despite the fact that those preferences were initially balanced.
The experiential learning hypothesis further appears juxtaposed to ideas about the
positive association between risk aversion and age noted previously in the discussion on
the time-diversi®cation effect. Namely, in the domain of positive outcomes, experiential
learning links risk aversion to accumulated learning, which in turn is linked to age.
Resolution preference. Thaler (1981) found that large gains are discounted less heavily
than other outcomes (the ``magnitude effect''). Perhaps because of their overwhelming
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1994): the value of large gains that occur with small probabilities increases with delays in
uncertainty resolution. If a lottery implies the possibility of a large gain, then hope and the
magnitude effect will bias risk perception towards making that risk more attractive in the
long run. The same bias would result from a preference for ¯exibility=reversibility (Henry,
1974; Kreps, 1979) that should naturally lead to a desire to postpone irreversible risks.
Uncertainty about future preferences. Time may also introduce uncertainty about one's
preferences, not just outcomes, when consumers have to predict their own future
preferences (Kahneman and Snell, 1990). For example, a consumer who buys groceries
for an entire week has to predict how often he or she will prefer frozen yogurt over ice
cream for dessert that week. This prediction is often subject to uncertainty. How do
consumers deal with this uncertainty? Several lines of research have looked into variety
seeking as a strategy to construct portfolios to diversify away the risk of not knowing
precisely what one will want in the future, even controlling for changes in the environment.
Simonson (1990) showed that consumers prefer a greater degree of variety among
purchases from a product category when they choose simultaneously for future consump-
tion than when they choose items sequentially, one at a time at the time of consumption
(Simonson and Winer, 1992). Including even less preferred items as part of the set may be
considered a premium to insure against regret and the risk of not liking any particular item
at the time of consumption (cf. Kahn, Ratner, and Kahneman, 1997; Simonson, 1992).
Read and Loewenstein (1995) have reinterpreted these ®ndings as re¯ecting a bias in
consumers' predictions of how fast they reach satiation. Speci®cally, consumers predict
that they will be satiated faster than they really do (time contraction), resulting in excessive
diversi®cation. What has not been examined yet, is whether and how the length of the
delay between purchase and consumption may affect preference uncertainty and hence
choice.
3. Summary and Themes for Further Research
Several theories of time diversi®cation in ®nance have dismissed the decision horizon as
an irrelevant variable. In contrast, this paper argued that risk taking under a short horizon is
likely to be different than risk taking under a long horizon. This derives from a review of a
variety of recent contributions on realistic features of individual preferences over time:
dynamic inconsistencies, loss aversion, experiential learning, resolution preferences, and
uncertainties about preferences. These behavioral elements were reinforced by our
contention that through feedback and externalities, decision situations under risk are
structurally affected by the decision horizon.
We have also suggested that a good place to start further research would be to study the
impact of the decision horizon on (1) probability perception, via the probability weighting
function (how does a longer horizon affect pessimism and optimism?), (2) ambiguity (is a
longer horizon causing lack of con®dence in subjective beliefs?), and (3) background risk
(is a longer horizon associated with an increase in non-diversi®able=non-insurable risks?).
278 J. BAZ ET AL.On the more applied side, we can see three themes of research in marketing where the
role of decision horizons on perceptions of risk will be important.
Risk management in consumer choice. As suggested above, pre-commitment and
variety-seeking can be usefully re-examined as an issue of risk perception in the short
vs. the long run. But many other aspects of consumer behavior can also be seen as the
outcome of a risk-reduction strategy. For instance, between two risks of identical
description, consumers prefer the risk that has a stronger brand name attached to it.
This is essentially a phenomenon of decreased risk perception towards a risk (a branded
good) that has persisted in the long run. Issues of product warranties, and of waiting time
perception, among others, can fruitfully be re-examined along the same line.
Risk management in new product development. The inherent riskiness of new product
introduction should induce ®rms to develop a portfolio of products. Research questions
that have been left largely unanswered in marketing are whether positive feedback markets
indeed show more diversi®cation than markets where negative feedback has set in.
Managerial decision making and ambiguity. Managerial decision environments are
usually ambiguous. It seems therefore very fruitful to study in more depth how ambiguity
affects decision making in the short and the long run. For instance, Fox and Tversky
(1995) ®nd that aversion to ambiguity is limited to situations where the decision-makers
feel they lack competence. Thus decision-makers prefer to gamble on known chances, in
situations where they are admitted novices, while they don't mind taking risks on the basis
of vague information when they feel competent. Perhaps this interaction between
ambiguity-aversion and perceived competence explains the paradoxical observation that
troubled ®rms tend to engage in developing new but risky ventures whose success
probabilities are vague at best as opposed to following a more conservative policy
involving less ambiguous possibilities for recovery or growth. This observation is some-
what paradoxical (Bowman, 1980, 1982) in that from ®nance we are used to low-pro®t
going hand in hand with low-risk. The ®nding of Fox and Tversky (1995) suggests that
gambling on ambiguous ventures offers a troubled ®rm the luxury of short-run hope and
optimism.
Notes
1. This model is due to Quiggin (1982), with variants of this model due to Yaari (1987) and Allais (1988).
2. Nielsen (1985) shows that compounding lotteries increase their attractiveness if there is a chance that the
compound leads to a wealth level where the degree of risk aversion is lower than the initial wealth level, or if
the investor has some sort of limited liability.
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